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HARMONIZING REGULATIONS IN THE FINANCIAL 
SERVICES INDUSTRY THROUGH THE TRANSATLANTIC 
TRADE AND INVESTMENT PARTNERSHIP 
INTRODUCTION 
Inconsistent regulation across jurisdictions leads to inefficiencies, 
ineffective enforcement, and ultimately the effective deregulation of industries 
through jurisdictional shopping. The financial services industry1 is no 
exception to this rule and, in fact, could be the poster industry highlighting the 
detriment caused by inconsistent regulation. December 2007 marked the start 
of the worst worldwide financial crisis since the World War II.2 This financial 
crisis was caused by a variety of factors, but ineffective oversight and 
inconsistent regulation of the financial services industries in the United States 
and the European Union played a very important role in creating the 
environment that resulted in the unsound and sometimes criminal financial 
practices that contributed to the worldwide recession.3 Harmonizing financial 
regulations between the U.S. and the EU will help to provide a more stable, 
more profitable, and more sustainable worldwide financial industry. 
In July 2013, the United States and the European Union entered into 
negotiations on the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP).4 If 
completed, TTIP will be the largest free trade agreement in the world, 
accounting for more than half of the world’s gross domestic product (GDP) 
and thirty percent of the world’s trade.5 TTIP, coined the term “Economic 
NATO,” which has the potential to spur the global economy out of its current 
waning state, strengthen the commitment between two of the world’s largest 
 
 1 Financial Services Industry Definition, CENSUS.GOV, http://www.census.gov/cgi-bin/sssd/naics/ 
naicsrch?code=52&search=2012%20NAICS%20Search (refers to a variety of services provided by different 
entities under the Finance and Insurance Sector as defined by the U.S. Department of Commerce. These 
include but are not limited to transactions involving the creation, liquidation, or change in ownership of 
financial assets and/or in facilitating financial transactions). 
 2 THE NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH, BUSINESS CYCLE DATING COMMITTEE REPORT, 1 
(Sept. 20, 2010), http://www.nber.org/cycles/sept2010.pdf. 
 3 Declaration: Summit on Financial Markets and the World Economy, G20.ORG (Nov. 15, 2008), 
https://www.g20.org/sites/default/files/g20_resources/library/Washington_Declaration_0.pdf. 
 4 CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43158, PROPOSED TRANSATLANTIC TRADE AND INVESTMENT PARTNERSHIP 
(TTIP): IN BRIEF 3 (2013) (hereinafter CRS BRIEF).  
 5 Id. at 3. 
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superpowers, and ultimately become the global standard for many regulatory 
issues going forward.6 TTIP has three primary goals: to increase market access 
through the elimination of trade barriers; to enhance regulatory coherence and 
cooperation; and to develop new rules in the emerging “21st century” areas of 
trade.7 These goals apply to almost all sectors of the economy.8 However, 
some sectors have been specifically excluded from negotiations, while the 
inclusion of others is still in debate.9 The financial services industry is one 
sector that, despite both sides’ negotiators expressing their support for 
inclusion, is still being debated on each side’s home political landscapes.10 As 
such, whether or not financial services will be included in the final agreement 
is still very much in the air.11 This Comment will primarily focus on the goal 
of enhancing regulatory coherence and cooperation, specifically within the 
financial services industry using TTIP as a mechanism for achieving this goal. 
TTIP could become the leading example in regulatory cooperation, and 
because it would include more than forty percent of the world’s economy,12 the 
rest of the world would have no choice but to follow or be left behind. Most 
Free Trade Agreements (FTA) in the past have been largely concerned with the 
reduction of tariffs.13 However, because average U.S. and EU tariffs are 
already quite low,14 TTIP’s focus is on non-tariff trade barriers with an 
emphasis on the harmonization of regulations between the parties.15 Economic 
gains from greater regulatory compatibility could be significant,16 yet many 
observers have expressed some skepticism about whether a comprehensive 
agreement on regulatory issues between the two sides can be reached.17 
 
 6 Trine Flockhart, Can TTIP Be an “Economic NATO”?, GMF BLOG (Oct. 13, 2014), http://blog.gmfus. 
org/2013/10/14/can-ttip-be-an-economic-nato/. 
 7 CRS BRIEF, supra note 4, at 1. 
 8 See generally id.  
 9 Id. at 8. 
 10 See infra Part I.A.  
 11 CRS BRIEF, supra note 4, at 7–8.  
 12 WILLIAM H. COOPER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL30608, EU-US ECONOMIC TIES: FRAMEWORK, 
SCOPE, AND MAGNITUDE 2 (Apr. 2, 2013). 
 13 CRS BRIEF, supra note 4, at 6; see generally North American Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Can.-Mex., 
Dec. 17, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 289 (1993) [hereinafter NAFTA]; United States-Korea Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-
Korea., Apr. 1, 2007, available at http://www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/korus-fta/final-
text (focusing on the reduction of tariffs between the parties) [hereinafter KORUS]. 
 14 CRS BRIEF, supra note 4, at 6. 
 15 Id. 
 16 Id. 
 17 Id. 
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While the U.S. and European negotiators have officially stated their 
willingness to include financial services in the TTIP negotiations, several 
officials and experts on each side have voiced their concerns about doing 
this.18 In particular, the TTIP’s impact on European and U.S. financial reforms 
that are currently being implemented in the wake of the financial crisis is of 
particular concern.19 For example, U.S. officials are worried that including 
financial services in TTIP could effectively end up being a “race to the 
bottom” and significantly water down the Dodd-Frank Act.20 U.S. Trade 
Representative, Ambassador Michael Froman, specifically declared “that 
nothing we do in a trade agreement should undermine the ability of regulators 
on both sides to regulate in the public interest.”21 Additionally, Ambassador 
Froman emphasized the Administration’s support for the inclusion of financial 
services in TTIP, and the need to continue regulatory cooperation in other 
venues such as the G-20 and other international bodies in parallel with TTIP.22 
In contrast, the European Council’s confidential negotiating instructions, 
which were leaked, set encompassing goals for financial services in the TTIP, 
calling for a “common framework” that is “binding on all regulators and other 
competent authorities.”23 Binding national regulators to the treaty’s new 
principles and rules would extend much further than previous trade pacts made 
by the U.S.24 “EU negotiators reportedly are weighing proposals for new 
requirements to share data among regulators, improve coordination of the 
implementation of international financial agreements (such as Basel III on 
 
 18 SIMON JOHNSON & JEFFERY SCHOTT, FINANCIAL SERVICES IN THE TRANSATLANTIC TRADE AND 
INVESTMENT PARTNERSHIP, PETERSON INST. FOR INT’L ECON. 1 (2013), available at 
http://piie.com/publications/pb/pb13-26.pdf.  
 19 Id. 
 20 “Race to the bottom” is a phrase that refers to the lowering of standards in the pursuit of consistency 
due to the lack of being able to reach an agreement on more stringent standards. See Race to the Bottom 
Definition, FINANCIAL TIMES LEXICON, http://lexicon.ft.com/Term?term=race-to-the-bottom (last visited Dec. 
12, 2014). It should be noted that many U.S. companies are actually in favor of including financial services in 
hopes that a race to the bottom will occur and it will loosen many of the Dodd-Frank regulations.  
 21 Readout of Meeting between U.S. Trade Representative Michael Froman and EU Internal Market and 
Services Commissioner Michel Barnier, OFF. OF U.S. TRADE REP. (July 16, 2013), http://www.ustr.gov/about-
us/press-office/press-releases/2013/july/readout-amf-barnier.  
 22 JOHNSON & SCHOTT, supra note 18, at 1–2. 
 23 Directives for the Negotiation of the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership between the 
European Union and the United States of America, at para. 25, 27, GENERAL SECRETARIAT OF THE COUNCIL 
(June 17, 2013), http://www.s2bnetwork.org/fileadmin/dateien/downloads/EU-TTIP-Mandate-from-bfmtv-
June17-2013.pdf. 
 24 See infra Part I.B. 
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capital requirements), and restrict the extraterritorial application of financial 
regulations, among others.”25 
The financial crisis that began in the U.S. banking and financial services 
industries caused global financial instability on a scale not seen since The 
Great Depression. In response to this crisis, most developed countries have 
actively strengthened financial regulations aimed at preventing future 
collapses, albeit on different time tables and with different ideas on how to 
achieve long term financial stability.26 Several international organizations and 
conferences have also been working on these issues as well. These include: the 
Basel Committee for Banking Supervision (Basel),27 the Financial Markets 
Regulatory Dialogue (FMRD),28 the International Organization of Securities 
Commissions (IOSCO),29 the Financial Stability Board (FSB),30 and the G-
20.31 While these forums are necessary and helpful, the urgency of the 
financial crisis has waned along with the urgency to cooperate.32 As a result, 
many of the reforms suggested by these organizations are receiving less than 
emphatic support by the attending nations.33 
TTIP might be able to succeed in financial reform where others have failed 
for several reasons. First, fewer participants means fewer competing interests 
and thus more ability to reach common ground. Second, the sheer weight of the 
entire TTIP agreement will help spur cooperation on contentious issues as 
neither side will be willing to toss out the entire agreement based on relatively 
minor disagreements in policy.34 Third, the U.S. and EU are significant allies, 
thus the talks are less likely to break down over external issues.35 
This is not to imply that TTIP lacks significant hurdles in achieving 
regulatory harmonization. For example, TTIP negotiations are expected to 
 
 25 JOHNSON & SCHOTT, supra note 18, at 2. 
 26 See infra Part II. 
 27 JOHNSON & SCHOTT, supra note 18, at 2. 
 28 Id. 
 29 Id. 
 30 Id. 
 31 Id.; see infra Part II.C (for a more in depth analysis of the reforms currently being discussed in these 
forums). 
 32 See infra Part II.C. 
 33 Id. 
 34 See infra Part VI.C. 
 35 This is not without limitation, as Europe has recently threatened to end the talks if privacy issues are 
not addressed as a result of the NSA spying scandal. NSA Spying Threatens to Undermine U.S. Foreign Policy, 
Associated Press, Oct. 25, 2013, http://www.cbc.ca/news/world/nsa-spying-threatens-to-undermine-u-s-
foreign-policy-1.2252893.  
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conclude in December 2014 at the very earliest, with many expecting them to 
go much longer.36 Thus, the parties’ internal regulations in conflict with the 
TTIP might have to be delayed, upsetting lawmakers on both sides.37 Another 
major hurdle of regulatory harmonization is not infringing on the sovereignty 
of the states involved and the ability of their regulators to safeguard their own 
financial systems.38 
In order to achieve significant and meaningful regulatory harmonization, 
TTIP will need to address a few major disparities that currently exist as well as 
provide a framework going forward that will ensure future consistency, 
transparency, and cooperation among regulators. TTIP will need to designate a 
common accounting system in order to eliminate the uneconomical 
redundancies that occur when multiple states require their own separate and 
distinct financial reporting methods. It also needs to identify loopholes in each 
side’s regulations that companies currently exploit and then determine a joint 
solution in closing them. Another major area that needs to be addressed is 
providing safeguards against firms taking unnecessary risks that jeopardize the 
global financial system. 
In order to achieve these goals, TTIP’s framework should include 
guidelines for: the synchronization of existing regulations, regulatory policy 
initiation and development, effective regulatory implementation, cross-border 
supervision, high transparency standards, and enforcement of the harmonized 
regulations.39 Each one of these will help to ensure regulatory harmonization 
between the U.S. and EU, as well as spur economic growth through increased 
access to transatlantic markets.40 Consistency across borders is best achieved if 
cooperation starts at the beginning, facilitates the flow of information between 
parties, provides a mechanism for quick and effective implementation, and 
gives an effective mode of communication and transparency between 
regulators and industry.41 
If successful, TTIP will have an immediate and significant global impact.42 
The partnership will significantly reduce costs associated with non-tariff trade 
 
 36 JOHNSON & SCHOTT, supra note 18, at 2.  
 37 Id. at 7.  
 38 Id. at 2.  
 39 INST. OF INT’L FIN., PROMOTING GREATER INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY CONSISTENCY 3–4 (June 
2013). 
 40 See generally id. 
 41 See generally id. 
 42 See infra Part VI. 
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barriers that currently hinder investment, trade, and therefore job 
opportunities.43 As a result, TTIP could possibly boost the world out of its 
most recent economic downturn.44 TTIP would reinforce the United States’ 
and Europe’s commitment to each other as critical partners and allies in the 
international community. Furthermore, TTIP could serve as the prominent 
example of global regulatory cooperation.45 The EU and the U.S. would be the 
leaders in global financial regulation, forcing Asia and emerging markets to 
follow suit.46 
TTIP also has potential negative impacts such as an inequitable distribution 
of costs and benefits.47 Some critics say that it might derail contemporary 
efforts in the G-20 and Basel conventions and that the bilateral agreement will 
leave many stakeholders out with no input on the process.48 Additionally, 
regulatory harmonization might slow the already sluggish regulatory process 
and prevent governments from reacting swiftly to future crises.49 Despite these 
potential negative impacts, the advantages of including financial services in 
TTIP will greatly outweigh the disadvantages as long as negotiators take the 
right approach and do not cause a “race to the bottom” by eroding current 
regulation efforts. 
This Comment will provide a brief background and history of the TTIP 
agreement and some of the debate surrounding the inclusion of financial 
services into the agreement. Then Part II will discuss how the current EU and 
U.S. financial regulations that are currently either being implemented or in the 
legislative process will not be supplanted by TTIP but instead will either be 
reinforced or made even stronger. Part III will shed light on the significant 
costs associated with inconsistent regulation and the overall savings that can be 
achieved through harmonization. Part IV identifies three major areas where 
harmonization can have an immediate and lasting effect on the U.S. and EU 
economies. Part V will provide a potential roadmap for achieving regulatory 
harmonization through TTIP. Part VI will discuss the global impact of TTIP, if 
it is successful in achieving harmonization, and the future of the financial 
 
 43 CRS BRIEF, supra note 4, at 5. 
 44 Id. 
 45 Id. 
 46 Id. 
 47 For example, depending on what accounting system is approved, firms in the U.S. or EU could face 
significant conversion costs to become compliant. See infra Part IV.A. 
 48 CRS BRIEF, supra note 4, at 5. 
 49 JOHNSON & SCHOTT, supra note 18, at 2. 
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services sector. The Comment will conclude with a summary of the arguments 
made. 
I. BACKGROUND 
TTIP emerged from a summit in November 2011 after U.S. and EU 
officials established a High-Level Working Group (HLWG) in an effort to 
strengthen the transatlantic economic partnership.50 This part will provide a 
basic history of TTIP’s progression from inception to its current status, and a 
brief history of U.S. reluctance to include financial services in previous free 
trade agreements.  
A. History of TTIP 
The HLWG was tasked with identifying “policies and measures to increase 
U.S.-EU trade and investment to support mutually beneficial job creation, 
economic growth, and international competitiveness.”51 On February 11, 2013, 
the HLWG issued its final report recommending the immediate need for both 
sides to initiate formal domestic procedures necessary to launch negotiations 
on a comprehensive trade and investment agreement.52 Two days later, the 
Obama administration and European leaders issued a joint statement 
announcing their intent to pursue the HLWG’s recommendation.53 One month 
later, on March 20, 2013, President Obama notified the U.S. Congress of his 
intent to enter into negotiations on a comprehensive trade and investment 
agreement with the European Union.54 On June 17, 2013, President Obama and 
European leaders announced the first round of negotiations for TTIP would 
take place during the week of July 8, 2013.55 The second round of negotiations 
 
 50 U.S.-EUR. UNION HIGH LEVEL WORKING GRP. ON JOBS AND GROWTH, FINAL REPORT 1 (Feb. 11, 
2013), available at http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2013/february/tradoc_150519.pdf. 
 51 Id. 
 52 Id. 
 53 U.S., EU Announce Decision to Launch Negotiations on a Transatlantic Trade and Investment 
Partnership, OFF. OF THE U.S. TRADE REP. (Feb. 13, 2013) (statement from U.S. President Barack Obama, 
Eur. Council President Herman Van Rompuy, and European Comm’n President José Manuel Barroso), 
available at http://www.ustr.gov/about-us/press-office/press-releases/2013/february/statement-US-EU-
Presidents.  
 54 Letter from Demetrios Marantis, Acting U.S. Trade Representative, to Cong. (Mar. 20, 2013), 
available at http://www.ustr.gov/about-us/press-office/press-releases/2013/march/administration-notifies-
congress-ttip. 
 55 U.S. President Barack Obama, U.K. Prime Minister David Cameron, and Eur. Comm’n President José 
Manuel Barroso, Remarks on the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (Jun. 17, 2013), available at 
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was planned for the week of October 2, 2013; however, due to the U.S. 
government shutdown, the talks were postponed until the week of November 
11, 2013, followed by the third round during the week of December 16, 2013.56 
The fourth, fifth, sixth, and seventh rounds occurred during the weeks of 
March 10, 2014; May 19, 2014; July 14, 2014; and September 29, 2014, 
respectively.57 The eighth round has not been scheduled as of November 12, 
2014. 
After the first week of closed negotiations, officials from both sides began 
making remarks regarding the inclusion of financial services in the 
negotiations. EU Internal Markets Commissioner, Michael Barnier, began 
pushing to include financial regulation in trade talks to avoid haphazard deal 
making with different U.S. regulators.58 However, Treasury Secretary, Jacob 
Lew “emphasized that prudential and financial regulatory cooperation should 
continue in existing and appropriate global fora, such as the G-20, Financial 
Stability Board, and international standard setting bodies, consistent with 
existing ambitious international timelines,” a Treasury spokeswoman said.59 
Secretary Lew also said, “we will not let the pursuit of international 
consistency force U.S. to lower our standards.”60 Mr. Barnier countered by 
saying he thought the “reticence on the side of the U.S. Treasury” to include 
financial services in trade talks was not so much an issue of substance but 
rather of “the division of competences between the Treasury and the 
independent regulators in the United States.”61 
This rift started a flurry of speculation over whether financial services 
would ultimately be included in the TTIP negotiations with no real resolution 
on the matter as of November 2014. However, other U.S. officials have since 
issued statements regarding their support for the inclusion of financial services 




 56 Press Release, Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, Announcement of Next Round of Transatlantic 
Trade and Investment Partnership Negotiations (Nov. 2013).  
 57 Readouts from T-TIP Negotiating Rounds, Office of the US Trade Representative, http://www.ustr. 
gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/transatlantic-trade-and-investment-partnership/readouts (last 
visited Nov. 13, 2014). 
 58 Jamila Trindle and Tom Fairless, U.S. Wants Fin. Services Off Table in EU Trade Talks, WALL ST. J., 
(July 15, 2013), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424127887323394504578607841246434144.  
 59 Id. 
 60 Jack Lew, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t Treasury, Remarks at the 2013 Delivering Alpha Conference Hosted by 
CNBC and Institutional Investor (July 17, 2013). 
 61 Trindle, supra note 58. 
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should be excluded from our efforts to enhance regulatory convergence, 
including financial services.” Further, he went on to say, “[g]iven the central 
importance of the financial sector to every other aspect of industrialized 
economies, I do not see how financial services regulation can be excluded from 
a meaningful T-TIP agreement.”62 European officials have also stepped up 
their rhetoric regarding the inclusion of financial services in TTIP. UK Deputy 
Prime Minister Nick Clegg said, “I think it’s essential that financial services 
[are] included in a comprehensive TTIP deal.”63 Clegg went on to say that 
since the crash in 2008 the regulations created in an effort to safeguard the 
world economy have diverged instead of converged, which leaves the whole 
system more fragile.64 TTIP, he said, is needed to remedy this divergence and 
help to make the system more stable.65 With the increased pressure from 
Europe and the support of key officials such as Sen. Hatch, financial services 
are gaining ground to be included in TTIP. However, prior to the sixth round, 
the U.S. had still not budged in its stance of excluding financial services.66 As 
a result, the EU stated its increased pressure by insisting that any issues 
regarding market access to financial services in the EU are also off the table.67 
While the progress on including financial services in the TTIP agreement has 
been less than ideal, it still remains a possibility. 
B. Historical Treatment of Financial Services in U.S. FTAs 
The historical treatment of financial services in FTAs plays an important 
part as to why U.S. officials have been reluctant to include the harmonization 
of regulations within TTIP. Unlike other traditional FTAs—such as the 
Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement (CUSFTA),68 the North American Free 
Trade Agreement (NAFTA),69 the Korea-US Free Trade Agreement 
(KORUS),70 and the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) from 
the World Trade Organization (WTO)71—TTIP hopes to increase market 
 
 62 The Transatlantic Trade and Inv. P’ship: Achieving the Potential: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on 
Fin., 113th Cong. (2013) (statement of Sen. Orrin Hatch, Member, S. Comm. on Fin.). 
 63 Nick Clegg, U.K. Prime Minister, TTIP and the Fifty States Conference (Sept. 24, 2013). 
 64 Id. 
 65 Id. 
 66 James Crisp, Financial services off the table at next round of TTIP talks, EURACTIV (June 16, 2014), 
http://www.euractiv.com/Parts/euro-finance/financial-services-table-next-round-ttip-talks-302808.  
 67 Id. 
 68 Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement, Jan. 2, 1988, 27 I.L.M. 293 [hereinafter CUSFTA]. 
 69 NAFTA, supra note 13. 
 70 KORUS, supra note 13. 
 71 General Agreement on Trade in Services, Dec. 15, 1993, 33 I.L.M. 1167 [hereinafter GATS].  
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access and eliminate non-tariff trade barriers through the harmonization of 
regulations.72 Whereas in the past, FTA provisions on financial services were 
merely an extension of most favored nation (MFN) treatment.73 They allowed 
market access but did not remove or even attempt to reconcile differing 
policies that proved to be significant barriers to entry into the market because 
of their cost to foreign firms.74 For example, in CUSFTA the financial services 
“terms allowed mutual access to each other’s markets, subject to ‘normal 
regulatory and prudential considerations’ (Article 1702, paragraph 4).”75 In 
other words, CUSFTA merely let U.S. and Canadian financial firms operate in 
one another’s markets, but there was no attempt whatsoever to harmonize 
regulations in each market. 
NAFTA, ratified in 1994, was the first to even provide the opportunity for 
regulatory harmonization though it did not require it.76 Article 1406:2 provided 
that “[a] party may recognize prudential measures of another Party or of a non-
Party,”77 but Article 1410:1 allowed prudential measures by each country to 
strengthen the safety, integrity, and stability of financial firms and the broader 
financial system.78 Both GATS and KORUS followed in the spirit of NAFTA 
by providing discretionary harmonization.79 GATS and KORUS, while 
including more extensive MFN and national obligations, specifically carry a 
very broad prudential exemption that effectively renders any of these 
obligations moot with any vague reasoning for safety, soundness, integrity, or 
financial responsibility to individual institutions.80 Again, although one Party 
has claimed its institutions are safe due to its own regulations, it does not 
prevent the other Party from imposing its own regulations on the other Party’s 
companies.81 
By following the example set in NAFTA in its other FTAs, the U.S. has 
been able to safeguard its financial industries by requiring more stringent 
regulations within the U.S. that place U.S. firms in a better position in regards 
to compliance, because international firms may lack restrictions in their home 
 
 72 JOHNSON & SCOTT, supra note 18, at 4. 
 73 Id. at 3.  
 74 Id. 
 75 Id. See CUFTA, supra note 68. 
 76 NAFTA, supra note 8. 
 77 Id. at 658. 
 78 Id. at 659. 
 79 See generally GATS, supra note 71; KORUS, supra note 13. 
 80 JOHNSON & SCOTT, supra note 18, at 3. 
 81 Id. 
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country.82 Additionally, U.S. firms can more easily open shop in a country 
with fewer regulations. In other words, the NAFTA and GATS model for 
financial services has been extremely favorable to the U.S. and its firms, which 
is one significant reason for the reluctance in broader regulatory 
harmonization.83 However, with TTIP, the U.S. is not dealing with developing 
countries’ immature regulatory schemes. Instead, it is dealing with Europe’s 
mature and robust regulatory scheme, which contains some standards that 
might be considered even stronger than the U.S.’s. As a result, with TTIP, the 
U.S. has an opportunity not only to increase its GDP but also its chance to 
become the de facto world standard by harmonizing its regulations with the 
EU. 
II. CURRENT U.S. AND EU FINANCIAL REGULATION 
Since the crash of 2007, the U.S. and the EU have implemented or are in 
the process of implementing sweeping financial regulations aimed at 
safeguarding against future global crises. This Part will broadly summarize the 
main pieces of legislation that are particularly relevant to the harmonization of 
financial regulations. First, it will discuss major changes in U.S. legislation and 
in particular the Dodd-Frank Act. Second, it will highlight the reforms taking 
place within the EU. Last, it will discuss the reforms that are being discussed 
in other global forums, such as the G-20. 
A. US Regulations 
The U.S. passed the Dodd-Frank Act in 2010.84 The Dodd-Frank Act 
implements a variety of changes. The Act creates the Consumer Protection 
Financial Bureau to ensure consumers get clear and accurate information when 
purchasing a variety of financial products.85 Dodd-Frank creates the Financial 
Stability Oversight Council (FSOC) to look out for the next big problem and 
address systemic risks within the financial industry.86 The Act ends “Too Big 
to Fail” bailouts by explicitly stating that taxpayers will not be responsible for 
 
 82 See generally CUSFTA, supra note 68; GATS, supra note 71; KORUS, supra note 13.  
 83 JOHNSON & SCOTT, supra note 18, at 4. 
 84 Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 12 U.S.C.A. § 5301 (2010).  
 85 STAFF OF S. COMM. ON BANKING, 111TH CONG., BRIEF SUMMARY OF THE DODD-FRANK WALL STREET 
REFORM AND CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT 2–3 (July 1, 2010), available at http://www.banking.senate.gov/ 
public/_files/070110_Dodd_Frank_Wall_Street_Reform_comprehensive_summary_Final.pdf. 
 86 Id. at 3–4. 
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bailing out failing financial companies.87 Dodd-Frank implements the Volcker 
Rule to prohibit conflicts of interest between banks and hedge funds.88 The 
FSOC can extend regulation to non-banks by requiring at-risk firms to submit 
to supervision by the Federal Reserve.89 The Act creates transparency and 
accountability in the derivatives market by closing regulatory gaps, requiring 
central clearing, and creating a higher standard of conduct.90 It reforms the 
mortgage industry by prohibiting unfair lending practices, ensuring the 
borrower’s ability to pay, and establishing penalties for irresponsible lending.91 
Last, it empowers regulators to aggressively pursue fraud, and other 
misdeeds.92 This list is by no means comprehensive. However, it highlights 
some of the larger provisions in the bill. The majority of these changes have 
not been implemented as of July 2013.93 In fact, the U.S. House of 
Representatives has passed eight bills in this year alone that would roll back 
certain provisions in the Dodd-Frank Act.94 
B. EU Regulations 
In response to the financial crisis, the European Commission established 
the High-Level Expert Group on Bank Structural Reform in 2012, whose 
findings became known as the Liikanen Report.95 The EU has introduced the 
European Market Infrastructure Regulation (EMIR), increasing the stability of 
the derivative markets,96 and the Capital Requirements Directive and 
Regulation (CRD IV), raising capital requirements to levels suggested in 
BASEL III.97 Other reforms are in the process of being finalized, such as the 
 
 87 Id. at 5–7. 
 88 Id. at 5. 
 89 Id.  
 90 Id. at 8. 
 91 Id. at 8–9. 
 92 Id. at 2. 
 93 See Donna Borak, Regulators Still in Dodd-Frank Quagmire Three Years Later, AM. BANKER 
(July 19, 2013), available at http://www.americanbanker.com/issues/178_139/regulators-still-in-dodd-frank-
quagmire-three-years-later-1060744-1.html. 
 94 Eric Lipton, House Votes to Repeal Dodd-Frank Provision, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 31, 2013), available at 
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/10/30/house-passes-bill-on-derivatives/?_r=0. 
 95 ERKKI LIIKANEN ET AL., HIGH-LEVEL EXPERT GROUP ON REFORMING THE STRUCTURE OF THE EU 
BANKING SECTOR: FINAL REPORT 1 (Feb. 2012), available at http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/bank/docs/ 
high-level_expert_group/liikanen-report/final_report_en.pdf. 
 96 Id. at 74. 
 97 Id. at 69. 
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Markets in Financial Instruments Directive II (MiFID II),98 increasing 
consumer protection,99 and the proposed directive on Bank Recovery and 
Resolution (BRR),100 addressing “Too Big To Fail” recovery options.101 
Additionally, the UK has developed its own version of the Volcker Rule in its 
“Vickers Report” which is now part of the Financial Services (“Banking 
Reform”) Act 2013.102 Implementation of the major recommendations of the 
Liikanen Report was adopted by the European Commission in the Proposal on 
Banking Reform on January 29, 2014.103 Many of the rules in the Proposal are 
variations on the U.S. and UK rules that have been implemented. These 
include a version of the Volker Rule, prohibiting proprietary trading,104 a rule 
to eliminate “Too Big To Fail” banks,105 rules regulating “Shadow 
Banking,”106 and a rule to potentially separate certain trading activities.107 As 
the EU just passed this proposal, it is in an earlier stage in implementing its 
financial reforms in response to the crisis. The majority of the proposal’s 
provisions will enter into effect in June 2015, but some will not be 
implemented until 2018.108 The EU is on a similar path as the U.S. and still has 
time to catch up, as long as the U.S. continues to delay the implementation of 
the major provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act. 
 
 98 Directive 2014/65/EU, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 2014 On Markets In 
Financial Instruments And Amending Directive 2002/92/EC and Directive 2011/61/EU, 2014 O.J. (L 173) 
(349). 
 99 LIIKANEN ET AL., supra note 95, at 74. 
 100 Directive 2014/59/EU, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 2014 Establishing a 
Framework for the Recovery and Resolution of Credit Institutions and Investment Firms and Amending 
Council Directive 82/891/EEC, and Directives 2001/24/EC, 2002/47/EC, 2004/25/EC, 2005/56/EC, 
2007/36/EC, 2011/35/EU, 2012/30/EU and 2013/36/EU, and Regulations (EU) No 1093/2010 and (EU) No 
648/2012, of the European Parliament and of the Council, 2014 O.J. (L 173) 191.  
 101 LIIKANEN, supra note 95, at 74. 
 102 THE INDEPENDENT COMMISSION ON BANKING: THE VICKERS REPORT, 2013, H.C. SN06171, at 7 
(U.K.). 
 103 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on Structural Measures 
Improving the Resilience of EU Credit Institutions, COM (2014) 43 final (Jan. 29, 2014). 
 104 Id. at 7–8. 
 105 Id. at 52. 
 106 Id. at 3. “Shadow Banking” is defined as “the system of credit intermediation that involves entities and 
activities outside the regular banking system.” Id. 
 107 Id. at 8. 
 108 Id. at 12. 
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C. International Forums’ Reforms 
Both the U.S. and the EU are members of the G-20, Basel, FMRD, FSB 
and IOSCO.109 These forums have been working toward global financial 
reform.110 While some international cooperation is occurring, the urgency of 
the financial crisis has waned and with it so has the urgency to cooperate.111 As 
a result, many of the reforms suggested by these forums are receiving less than 
emphatic support by the attending nations.112 The reforms that have been 
supported and passed by these organizations have significantly less teeth than 
the reforms being implemented by the U.S. and the EU. For example, the Basel 
III agreement set minimum requirements for equity capital using standardized 
measures.113 It also allowed countries to raise requirements for firms 
considered to be of systemic importance.114 However, the U.S. has already 
adopted a leverage ratio above the Basel III minimum.115 Additionally, as a 
report to the G-20 by the BCBS in October 2012 acknowledged, “there is a 
high probability that just six of the 29 global systemically important banks 
identified by the FSB in November 2011 will be subject to Basel III 
regulations from the globally agreed start date.”116 
Though precedent was made in 2008 with thirty-six recommendations 
adopted by G-20 leaders was made through the agreed international agenda for 
action that overlooks the entire financial system, 117 as FSB noted, 
[d]elays in adopting legislative and regulatory frameworks are 
contributing to regulatory uncertainty, which remains a significant 
obstacle to further market implementation of the G20 commitments. 
This uncertainty is compounded by the potential for conflicts, 
inconsistencies, duplication and gaps in the application of 
jurisdictions’ rules to cross-border activity. The incomplete state of 
 
 109 See id. at 2, Basel Committee Membership, BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS (Nov. 17, 2014), http:// 
www.bis.org/bcbs/membership.htm, Ordinary Members of IOSCO, OICU-IOSCO (Nov. 17, 2014), http:// 
www.iosco.org/lists/display_members.cfm?alpha=u&orderBy=jurSortName&memid=1, Associate Members 
of IOSCO, OICU-IOSCO (Nov. 17, 2014), http://www.iosco.org/lists/display_members.cfm?alpha=e&order 
By=jurSortName&memid=2, Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, U.S.–EU Financial Markets 
Regulatory Dialogue Joint Statement (July 11, 2014), http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/ 
Pages/jl2564.aspx.  
 110 Id. 
 111 INST. OF INT’L FIN., supra note 39, at 1. 
 112 Id. at 2. 
 113 JOHNSON & SCHOTT, supra note 18, at 8. 
 114 Id. 
 115 See id. 
 116 INSTITUTE OF INT’L FIN., supra note 39, at 14. 
 117 Id. at 13. 
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development of regulatory proposals in most jurisdictions, including 
the lack of preliminary guidance in almost all FSB jurisdictions 
regarding the approach to cross-border activity, makes it more 
difficult to assess the extent to which any such cross-border issues in 
regulatory reforms might frustrate jurisdictions’ collective 
achievement of the G20 goals.118 
Thus, while these international organizations have certainly made progress 
never before seen on the global or international level, the progress is not on the 
scale or the timeline needed to ensure global financial stability. In fact, many 
of the reforms identified by these organizations are not expected to be fully 
implemented until 2019.119 Secretary Lew’s comments after the first round of 
TTIP discussions are somewhat surprising considering the lack of actual 
results achieved in these international forums.120 His overall commitment to 
completing the Dodd-Frank reforms by the end of 2013 is expected, although 
at this point not likely. Instead of viewing TTIP as a threat to the 
implementation of Dodd-Frank, Secretary Lew could have seen it as an 
opportunity to implement the much stronger Dodd-Frank rules on a much 
larger scale. If TTIP negotiators were willing to have a race to the top (instead 
of the bottom), the U.S. and the EU could agree on a framework that would 
result in the strengthening of financial reforms for both sides. TTIP could then 
provide the negotiating power in these other international forums that could 
impose a stronger approach and a quicker timeline than currently exists. 
III. COSTS OF INCONSISTENT REGULATION 
The financial crisis underlined the significance of interdependent global 
markets and the need for international consistency in financial regulations. 
Inconsistency has proven to have significant costs across the board. Financial 
instability, increased costs to financial institutions, and increased costs to end 
users of the financial industry all occur due to inconsistencies in cross-border 
regulations.121 Part III will discuss each of these costs in detail, which will help 
identify exactly what areas harmonization can help reduce significant costs in 
the financial services industry. 
 
 118 FINANCIAL STABILITY BOARD, OTC DERIVATIVES MARKET REFORMS: FIFTH PROGRESS REPORT ON 
IMPLEMENTATION 4 (Apr. 15, 2013), available at http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_ 
130415.pdf. 
 119 See INST. OF INT’L FIN., supra note 39, at 15. 
 120 See supra Part I. 
 121 See INST. OF INT’L FIN., supra note 39, at 9–11. 
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A. The Costs of Financial Instability 
Inconsistencies in regulatory measures reduce capital, increase risk, and 
ultimately undermine the stability of the global financial market.122 For 
example, international banks are currently forced to hold differing amounts of 
dedicated capital at many different locations across jurisdictions instead of 
being able to manage all branches from a centralized location.123 This ends up 
reducing the amount of capital that can be introduced into the financial 
system.124 Regulatory agencies face a much more difficult task in assessing the 
risks and vulnerabilities of both national and global markets due to diverging 
financial reporting requirements.125 Additionally, the lack of cross-border 
interagency cooperation and coordination causes a serious deficit in detecting 
risks in international firms and the global market as a whole.126 Most 
importantly of all, because financial crises are inevitable, the ability of national 
authorities to respond swiftly, decisively, and effectively to a global financial 
crisis is of paramount importance.127 Unfortunately, inconsistency severely 
hinders this ability as can be evidenced by the ongoing fractured responses 
from countries around the world to the latest crisis nearly seven years later.128 
B. Increased Costs to Financial Institutions 
Inconsistent regulations serve as a significant barrier to entry into new 
markets for firms wanting to branch out internationally.129 They cause 
significant increases in costs due to the need to comply with two or more 
different sets of rules,130 giving domestic firms a distinct competitive 
advantage of lower operating costs.131 For example, a U.S. company that only 
competes in U.S. markets only has to comply with the Generally Accepted 
Accounting Principles (GAAP) because that is the accounting standard in the 
U.S.,132 whereas a firm that competes in both the EU and the U.S. must comply 
 
 122 Id. at 15. 
 123 Id. at 9. 
 124 Id.  
 125 Id. at 10. 
 126 Id. 
 127 Id. 
 128 See supra Part II. 
 129 See INST. OF INT’L FIN., supra note 39, at 9–12. 
 130 Id. at 10. 
 131 Id. 
 132 Chris Dumont, International Financial Reporting Standards: What You Need to Know, INVESTOPEDIA 
(Oct. 23, 2014), http://www.investopedia.com/articles/fundamental-analysis/12/international-financial-
reporting-standards.asp. 
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with GAAP and with International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS).133 
This not only costs firms significant amounts to maintain two separate versions 
of their books but also hurts investors trying to reconcile the two sets of 
books.134 As a result, international firms are not as competitive, and the 
inconsistent information could cause the firm to lose investors, widening the 
gap between domestic and international firms even more. Further, regulators’ 
inconsistent responses to potential international conflicts of regulation can 
make it extremely difficult for firms to plan ahead.135 Additionally, multiple 
reporting requirements often require more one type of IT or data collection 
system, which on their own have significant costs, but perhaps the biggest cost 
comes from the inability to accurately reconcile these systems, resulting in 
decisions based on imperfect or incomplete information.136 All of these costs 
result in fewer firms participating in foreign markets, which results in lost 
opportunities and revenue for international firms. 
C. Increased Costs to End Users 
For end-users, insufficient consistency leads to reduced choice and higher 
costs. All the firms that decided to stay out of or leave foreign markets means 
less choice, reduced competition and higher prices for domestic consumers.137 
Investors face many of the same problems as consumers. They will have fewer 
choices in companies to invest in domestically along with the added problem 
of having to navigate multiple regulatory landscapes, accounting standards, 
and disclosure requirements of those international firms that do enter or stay in 
the market.138 If firms have difficulty in reconciling their own information, 
investors have much more difficulty evaluating this information and making 
sound investments.139 This results in less investment as a whole and again 
means higher costs for the funding that is available to firms. 
 
 133 WORK PLAN FOR THE CONSIDERATION OF INCORPORATING INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL REPORTING 
STANDARDS INTO THE FINANCIAL REPORTING SYSTEM FOR U.S. ISSUERS: FINAL STAFF REPORT 22, U.S. SEC. 
AND EXCH. COMM’N. (July 13, 2012) available at http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/ 
globalaccountingstandards/ifrs-work-plan-final-report.pdf (providing an in depth comparison of the two 
systems) [hereinafter SEC STAFF REPORT]. 
 134 See INST. OF INT’L FIN., supra note 39, at 10. 
 135 Id. 
 136 Id. at 11. 
 137 Id. at 10. 
 138 Id. 
 139 Id. 
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The IIF report aptly noted that, “[m]ore work needs to be done to assess the 
magnitude of these costs and their individual and cumulative impact but even 
without such analysis, it is clear that these effects are at the very least high, 
undesirable, and a deadweight loss to national economies and the global 
economy.”140 International regulatory inconsistency ultimately causes systemic 
inefficiencies in the financial services marketplace hurting everyone except the 
protected domestic firms who have no interest in international expansion. 
Harmonization of regulations through TTIP will help to eliminate and reduce 
these inefficiencies which will boost both the domestic and global economies 
for years to come. 
IV. MAJOR AREAS THAT NEED HARMONIZATION 
Part III addressed the costs of divergent regulations on trading partners. 
Part IV will focus on specific areas of regulation that if harmonized could 
drastically reduce those costs. The first area that needs harmonization is a 
common accounting standard. The second involves closing existing loopholes. 
Finally, the third area where harmonization is drastically needed is 
safeguarding against unnecessary risks. If TTIP can address these major issues 
and provide a framework for the future, it will make a serious impact on global 
financial stability, solidify the U.S. and EU positions in the global economy as 
the standard setters, and provide additional benefits discussed in further detail 
in Part VI. 
A. Convergence into a Single Accounting Standard 
Two major accounting standards currently exist in the modern financial 
world.141 GAAP is only used as a regulatory standard in the U.S.,142 but 
because of the U.S. domination in global financial services, it is an absolutely 
necessary standard for firms wishing to compete in U.S. markets and those 
wishing to entice American investors.143 The IFRS on the other hand is an 
international standard that was created by the International Accounting 
Standards Board (IASB), an independent organization comprised of sixteen 
 
 140 Id. at 11. 
 141 See supra Part III (discussing GAAP and IFRS).  
 142 Dumont, supra note 132. 
 143 SEC STAFF REPORT, supra note 133. 
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members from various nationalities including the U.S. and EU.144 The IFRS 
has been adopted by more than 100 countries, including all of those within the 
EU.145 While many similarities exist between the two standards, there are also 
significant differences that can result in large disparities in reporting income 
and expenses.146 For example, the IFRS does not allow certain inventory 
methods, and certain development costs must be capitalized as opposed to 
expensed under GAAP.147 
As mentioned in Part III, divergence in accounting standards is a major cost 
and burden to the global financial industry. Not only does it result in additional 
costs to international firms, it significantly hinders investors’ ability to 
properly evaluate firms in other markets.148 Since 2002, the IASB and the U.S. 
Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB)149 have been working together 
toward achieving convergence between IFRS and GAAP.150 The G-20 
reaffirmed this commitment to convergence in January 2013, when it called on 
standard setters to “set out by the end of 2013 their plans for achieving 
convergence on high-quality standards.”151 
The G-20, however, is not a binding organization, and as such, the 
accounting-standard push has hit a wall with the U.S.152 In July 2013, the U.S. 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) released its final staff report on 
global accounting-standard convergence.153 In its report, the SEC staff cited 
several areas in which the accounting approaches diverge, such as impairment 
models for property, plant, and equipment, as well as inventory and intangible 
assets.154 The significant expense that both large and small companies could 
 
 144 About the IFRS Foundation and IASB, IFRS, http://www.ifrs.org/The-organisation/Pages/IFRS-
Foundation-and-the-IASB.aspx (last visited Oct. 30, 2014); see also Members of the IASB, IFRS.ORG, http:// 
www.ifrs.org/About-us/IASB/Members/Pages/Members-of-the-IASB.aspx (last visited Oct. 30, 2014). 
 145  Paul Pacter, Global Accounting Standards—From Vision to Reality, THE CPA J. 6 (Jan. 2014), 
http://www.ifrs.org/Alerts/Publication/Documents/2014/CPA_Journal_Global_Accounting_Standards_January
_2014.pdf. 
 146 See SEC STAFF REPORT, supra note 133, at 14–17. 
 147 Id. 
 148 See supra Part III. 
 149 The FASB is the governing body in charge of setting the standards in GAAP. Facts about the FASB, 
FASB, http://www.fasb.org/jsp/FASB/Page/PartPage&cid=1176154526495 (last visited Oct. 29, 2014). 
 150 Convergence between IFRSs and U.S. GAAP, IFRS, http://www.ifrs.org/Use-around-the-world/ 
Global-convergence/Convergence-with-US-GAAP/Pages/Convergence-with-US-GAAP.aspx (last visited 
Oct. 29, 2014). 
 151 INST. OF INT’L FIN., supra note 39, at 16. 
 152 SEC STAFF REPORT, supra note 133. 
 153 Id. 
 154 Id. at 14–17. 
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incur in any switch from GAAP to IFRS was also a sticking point.155 The staff 
noted, “[m]any of the issuers indicated that the costs of full IFRS adoption 
could easily be among the most significant costs ever required from an 
accounting perspective.”156 
The EU should use TTIP to make the U.S. commit to the IFRS. In general, 
TTIP negotiations on financial services should not focus on specific regulatory 
measures, as they are too complex and detailed for this type of agreement. 
However, the accounting standard is one specific regulatory measure that 
definitely should be included in the negotiations. TTIP should be used to force 
the SEC’s hand in the matter; even though the initial conversion cost for U.S. 
firms may be high, the overall net gain to the U.S. economy will be much 
greater. 
B. Closing Loopholes in Existing Financial Regulations 
Both parties have loopholes in their existing regulatory regimes that have 
been exploited over the years, and as long as there are regulations, lawyers will 
keep finding new loopholes to jump through that game the system. The 
financial crisis of 2008 is a prime example of firms exploiting gaps in 
regulatory scheme. Financial institutions developed new products that, while 
not illegal, helped them mask their risky investments and then sold them to 
unwitting third parties.157 Both the EU and the U.S. have passed legislation and 
are currently in the process of implementing new rules that will hopefully 
prevent this from occurring in the future.158 Using TTIP to harmonize these 
new rules will provide regulators with the best opportunity to prevent future 
abuses. First, harmonization will prevent firms from jurisdictional shopping 
between the two largest financial markets in the world. For example, if the EU 
implements a rule that is more favorable to financial firms with less protection 
for the consumer, then many large firms might relocate to Europe; in an effort 
to regain competiveness, the U.S. would have to lower its standards. This back 
and forth would continue until it was a “race to the bottom,” resulting in 
 
 155 Id. at 3. 
 156 Id. 
 157 Although illegal actions definitely contributed to the collapse, some of the methods used by these 
institutions were completely legal under the regulatory system at that time. See Origins of the Financial Crisis: 
A Crash Course, ECONOMIST (Sept. 7, 2013), available at http://www.economist.com/news/schoolsbrief/ 
21584534-effects-financial-crisis-are-still-being-felt-five-years-article (outlining the many causes of the crash, 
both legal and illegal). 
 158 See supra Part II. 
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effective deregulation.159 However, harmonization with the full intent to keep 
the best parts of each side’s new regulations will result in stronger, safer, and 
more effective regulations. 
C. Safeguarding Against Unnecessary Risk Taking 
As previously mentioned in Part II, financial institutions made extremely 
risky investments on such a large scale, that the entire world economy was 
brought to its knees when those investments failed.160 While the current 
reforms being implemented are addressing some of those risks,161 it will only 
be a matter of time before firms find loopholes in those regulations and exploit 
them. Harmonization and cooperation among the regulators in the U.S. and the 
EU should be able to identify and manage future risks and loopholes better 
than without such action. One, they will have more resources combined than 
either will ever have on its own. Two, they will have only one set of 
harmonized rules to analyze as opposed to two. Three, they will be able to 
share best practices that will make them more efficient at doing so. 
V. HOW TO ACHIEVE REGULATORY HARMONIZATION THROUGH TTIP 
The real challenge that TTIP faces in harmonizing financial regulations is 
how to implement a process that will yield meaningful cooperation between 
the U.S. and the EU without infringing on the sovereignty of either party. Part 
V will discuss potential solutions that the TTIP negotiators should consider 
when drafting the final agreement. The Institute of International Finance (IIF) 
developed a sixteen-point plan that would facilitate greater international 
regulatory consistency.162 This Part draws on this plan and applies many of the 
concepts in the specific context of TTIP instead of a general global manner. 
First, it will discuss ways in which TTIP can facilitate the synchronization of 
existing regulatory policies. Second, it will establish guidelines for regulatory 
policy initiation and development. Third, it will provide a method for 
regulatory implementation. Fourth, it will discuss possible avenues for cross-
border supervision. Fifth, it will discuss the need for transparency standards. 
Last, it will discuss the enforcement mechanism. 
 
 159 INST. OF INT’L FIN., supra note 39, at 8; see also JOHNSON & SCHOTT, supra note 18, at 6–7.  
 160 See Origins of the Financial Crisis, supra note 157. 
 161 See supra Part II. 
 162 INST. OF INT’L FIN., supra note 39, at 1. 
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A. Synchronization of Existing Regulatory Policies 
TTIP should create a bilateral independent commission (BIC)163 charged 
with evaluating each party’s existing financial regulations and the disparities 
between the two. This commission should consist of top regulators from both 
sides and should have an aggressive schedule of deadlines to ensure progress 
in major areas of divergence. Additionally, this committee should identify key 
loopholes in their regulations that firms exploit and come up with a joint 
solution to close them. This commission should also serve as the starting point 
for new regulations and standards. BIC should also identify appropriate 
standard setters for the various areas of financial regulations such as the IASB 
for the accounting system. 
TTIP should get a binding commitment from the U.S. to convert to the 
IFSR on a strict timeline that will provide adequate time for the conversion. 
Negotiating this directly within the TTIP agreement will provide the EU with 
more negotiating power and will not allow such a large and important 
divergence to continue. The U.S. is on the IASB and thus can lobby for 
changes in the rules through the appropriate forum during its implementation 
phase.164 If the U.S. agrees to do this then it may bargain for a more favorable 
stance elsewhere in the agreement that might be able to subsidize the 
transition. 
B. Guidelines for Regulatory Policy Initiation and Development 
“Consistency is easiest to deliver if right from the start there is a common 
analyses of the risks and how to address them rather than after national 
regulators have developed their own approaches.”165 BIC should establish best 
practices guidelines for national regulators to use in identifying and addressing 
emerging risks and concerns.166 Not only will this foster and encourage 
cooperation between the U.S. and EU regulators, but it will also enhance 
 
 163 This acronym serves only as a generic placeholder name for the hypothetical commission and is not 
meant to represent any existing entity or organization. 
 164 “The International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) is an independent group of 14 experts with an 
appropriate mix of recent practical experience in setting accounting standards, in preparing, auditing, or using 
financial reports, and in accounting education. Broad geographical diversity is also required.” International 
Accounting Standards Board, IFRS, http://www.ifrs.org/About-us/IASB/Members/Pages/Members-of-the-
IASB.aspx (last visited Nov. 3, 2014). Three of these experts are from the U.S., two former SEC employees 
and one former FASB member. Id.  
 165 INST. OF INT’L FIN., supra note 39, at 20. 
 166 Id. at 19. 
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communication through a common regulatory language and approach to 
problems. When these concerns arise, BIC should answer the following 
questions to determine the appropriate remedy: is a common or national 
approach needed; what is the regulation’s priority; and what are the impacts of 
the proposed regulation.167 If it is determined that a national approach is 
needed instead of a common approach, BIC should serve as an intermediary 
between the two national systems to mitigate possible divergences and assess 
any external impacts of the regulation.168 BIC and national regulators should 
work towards regulations that effectively balance international consistency and 
local flexibility.169 This balance should be considered when determining 
whether a minimum or maximum harmonization approach is taken with 
respect to the proposed regulation.170 All proposed regulations or standards 
should have comprehensive impact assessments completed to determine the 
effects on both the micro- and macro-economic levels.171 BIC should set 
appropriate deadlines for agreement based on the urgency and priority of 
proposed regulations.172 
C. Regulatory Implementation 
BIC should provide national agencies with detailed interpretations that 
facilitate mutual understanding and recognition between jurisdictions.173 This 
will help to prevent inconsistent outcomes across jurisdictions and eliminate 
uncertainty within international firms. National regulators must buy into the 
system. They must communicate and coordinate with BIC throughout the 
implementation process in order to prevent unilateral divergence.174 If national 
regulators identify fundamental problems in international standards, they 
should notify BIC of the issue and work together to find appropriate solutions 
that preserve cross-border consistency as much as possible.175 If it is 
determined that exceptions or extensions need to be unilaterally applied then 
they should be approached with a collaborative effort to limit the divergence. 
BIC should create a system to catalog all financial services regulations, 
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 175 See id. 
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interpretations, and standards of all parties.176 This system must be easily 
accessible by national regulators and will help to identify and prevent 
conflicting regulations. National regulators and BIC should work together to 
identify and report any material inconsistencies between national and 
international standards.177 BIC should have a forward looking approach that 
focuses on long-term regulatory consistency that will safeguard and promote 
sustainable financial prosperity.178 
D. Cross-border Supervision 
In order to effectively detect risks and coordinate swift and appropriate 
responses to these risks, regulators must have access to data about both a firms 
local and international operations.179 Without this information, a firm might be 
able to hide significant risks from one or any number of regulators. Because of 
this potential to mask risk, it is imperative that BIC identify any unnecessary 
barriers to cross-border sharing of data and information between regulators.180 
However, BIC should place an emphasis on protecting proprietary information 
and high data protection standards, while eliminating excessive barriers to data 
sharing between regulators.181 Regulators must communicate with each other 
and BIC to ensure decisions in any jurisdiction are understood by all, so as to 
promote coordination and consistency.182 BIC should be able to appoint crisis 
management groups that consist of top regulators in the various areas of 
financial services.183 These groups should meet regularly to identify potential 
crisis areas and develop preventative and reactionary plans to promptly correct 
financial crises. BIC should periodically examine the effectiveness of inter-
agency communication and address any problem areas if they arise.184 
E. Transparency Standards 
Because TTIP would be the first agreement of its kind to achieve such a 
high level of regulatory harmonization, transparency in rule-making, 
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implementation, and enforcement is absolutely necessary.185 In order to 
preserve an appropriate level of transparency, most actions of both national 
regulators and BIC should be within the public purview and subject to scrutiny. 
Throughout the regulatory and supervisory process, BIC should be open to 
input from industry leaders, consumers, and other stakeholders.186 Indeed, BIC 
should have regular meetings with industry advisory committees, consumer 
protection groups, and national lawmakers to discuss economic and regulatory 
issues.187 Additionally, BIC should have continuous interaction with other 
global standard setters such as the G-20, BASEL, and others.188 This will not 
only help it stay on top of other global trends but also help to exert its 
influence on those trends. 
F. Enforcement 
Enforcement of these regulations should follow the procedure of each 
party’s established court system. A collaborative effort to harmonize mutually 
beneficial regulations will not infringe on nations’ abilities to enforce their 
own laws, because the harmonization is not all-encompassing. A collaborative 
effort to harmonize mutually beneficial regulations and will not infringe on the 
ability of nations to enforce their own laws. Therefore, all enforcement actions 
must be solely up to the party whose regulation was violated. If a firm violates 
regulations in multiple jurisdictions, then it can be held liable in every 
jurisdiction. 
If followed, the six suggestions could provide an adequate base for 
regulators to effectively harmonize U.S. and EU financial regulations in a 
timely manner so that gains discussed in the next section can be realized. 
These are mere suggestions, however, and are by no means the only way to go 
pursue harmonization. The negotiation process will surely foster other 
innovative and effective options for successfully harmonizing regulations. This 
Part shows a potential path towards realizing significant gains through the 
reduction of non-tariff barriers. 
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VI. GLOBAL IMPACT IF TTIP IS SUCCESSFULLY NEGOTIATED AND RATIFIED 
TTIP will provide wide-ranging and lasting effects on the global economy, 
the global power and political structure, as well as substantial gains to 
individuals throughout the U.S. and the EU. Part VI will discuss economic 
gains to the U.S. and EU as a result of harmonization in the financial industry, 
then address the impact to individual companies, investors, and consumers in 
the U.S. and EU. Next, it will look at the impact on the US/EU political 
landscape and how that will affect the rest of the global political arena. Finally, 
Part VI will discuss some of the opposing arguments that critique the impacts 
of TTIP. 
A. Economic Gains for the U.S. and EU 
In terms of the economic impact, a variety of studies have been completed 
that project the overall impact to the U.S., EU, and global economies. One of 
particular note is a study by the Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR), 
a leading independent pan-European economic research organization.189 The 
CEPR study falls very near the middle of all studies in terms of projected 
economic gains.190 The CEPR predicts that TTIP will increase the size of the 
EU economy by €120 billion (0.5% of GDP) and the U.S. economy by €95 
billion (0.4% of GDP).191 These increases would be a permanent increase that 
would occur every year.192 These increases are across all sectors that are 
currently included in the TTIP negotiations.193 
The study goes in depth in all of the sectors identified. Specifically, for the 
financial services sector, the study points out that Non-Tariff Barriers (NTBs) 
(which include regulatory divergence) are the major cause for increased costs 
between the EU and the U.S.194 The study found that the cost increases 
attributed to NTBs result in an effective tax rate of 11.3% in EU barriers to 
U.S. exports and 31.7% in U.S. barriers to EU exports.195 The study goes on to 
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assume that if TTIP would be able to eliminate approximately 25% of these 
NTBs through harmonization and convergence of regulations, then financial 
services alone could add €3.8 billion to Europe’s economy and €7 billion to the 
U.S. economy.196 Again this study prefers to err on the side of caution, so these 
numbers could easily be significantly higher.197 
B. Economic Gains for Individuals 
Harmonization through TTIP will also have a significant impact on 
individuals. The overall impact will provide €545 to the average family in 
Europe and €655 per family in the United States.198 Additionally, increased 
market access and lower costs to firms will increase competition and lower 
prices to everyone.199 Harmonization will also increase wages and create jobs 
for both skilled and unskilled workers through an overall increase in demand 
for products, increased productivity, and growth of the economy.200 It will 
provide smaller companies currently situated in solely the U.S. or EU to 
expand into the other’s markets previously unattainable due to the high costs 
associated with divergent regulatory regimes.201 Last, harmonization will 
provide investors more direct access to foreign markets as well as better 
information to make decisions. Because the U.S. and the EU are already each 
other’s largest Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) nation, any potential increase 
in access to the other’s market will have the potential to have a significant 
impact on FDI.202 
C. Global Political Implications 
TTIP can deepen the already substantial ties that bind the U.S. and the EU 
in the world’s largest economic and strategic alliance.203 TTIP, if successful, 
will serve to strengthen the U.S. commitment to the EU as a key ally in a world 
that is experiencing significant power shifts toward developing countries such 
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as China, Korea, and India.204 This is particularly important as the Obama 
Administration has undergone some “rebalancing” toward the Asia-Pacific 
region and could be seen as declining significance for the EU in U.S. economic 
policy.205 For example, the Trans-Pacific Partnership is another large FTA 
currently being negotiated between the U.S. and several countries in Southeast 
Asia and North America.206 
TTIP could have a major impact on multilateral trade liberalization, 
allowing the two sides to define the rules in trade liberalization in the absence 
of progress in other global fora such as BASEL III, the IASB, and the G-20.207 
Because the U.S. and EU make up more than half of the world’s GDP,208 other 
countries will be forced to move toward convergence in regulations with these 
two super powers or risk being left out of two of largest markets in the 
world.209 TTIP alone is projected to increase GDP in trading partners with the 
U.S. and EU by almost €100 billion.210 In this specific instance, if other 
countries participate in the harmonization due to the downward economic 
pressure created by TTIP, then the overall global gains could far exceed these 
numbers.211 
D. Critiques of TTIP 
However, skeptics believe that TTIP will not provide the advertised 
economic and strategic gains claimed by its proponents. Trade skeptics believe 
that TTIP and other trade liberalization efforts such as NAFTA and TPP lead 
to an inequitable distribution of costs and benefits.212 Specifically, they suggest 
the protectionist stance that free trade means adverse import competition for 
certain economic sectors which causes negative employment in these 
sectors.213 While this argument may hold true for certain industries, the 
argument is actually about the distribution of wealth in an economy and not 
about the harmful effects of trade liberalization. As almost any free-market 
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economist will argue, if the overall pie is larger, then everyone can have a 
larger piece.214 
Global foreign relations could be seriously strained by TTIP. While the 
impact on the transatlantic relationship is generally seen as a positive step 
toward stronger relations, if the negotiations stall or produce results not seen as 
sufficiently ambitious, further questions could be raised about the strength of 
the U.S./EU relationship.215 Additionally, TTIP could solicit backlash from 
those nations not included, especially if seen as a strategic move to weaken the 
economic positions of China and Russia. The partnership could help in further 
polarizing the political climate between these countries and the West. While 
this is a fair and valid argument, the global economy is so interconnected today 
that any backlash could cause severe and lasting damage to both China’s and 
Russia’s economies through decreased access to the world’s major financial 
markets and decreased foreign direct investment from these countries. 
TTIP, as an overarching free trade agreement, has the potential to create 
significant amounts of global wealth and prosperity.216 It could provide the 
world with the needed stimulus to spur a new wave of economic growth and 
could finally put an end to this period of slow growth caused by the financial 
crisis of 2008. TTIP also has the potential to create a new standard in global 
cooperation and the harmonization of regulations. More specifically, the 
harmonization of financial services regulations within TTIP could provide the 
framework that will be the gold standard for regulating the financial industries 
worldwide. In harmonizing the U.S. system with the European system, TTIP 
might just be able to create a sustainable financial industry that manages risk 
and consumer protection in the correct balance, which will hopefully serve to 
prevent major financial crises in the future. 
CONCLUSION 
Because TTIP is still in its infancy, many aspects of the agreement have yet 
to be decided. This indecision includes whether to even include financial 
services as part of the negotiations. Even after the seventh round of talks 
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concluded, the U.S. still opposed including financial services regulations. The 
EU continues to push for inclusion.217 Overall, whether financial services are 
included, TTIP is poised to have a significant impact on the European, 
American, and Global economies. That being said, financial services could 
ultimately be important inclusion adding significant value to the agreement. 
As noted in Part II, diverging policies and regulations in the financial 
services industry can have catastrophic consequences on the global scale. 
Ignoring the risk of global financial instability, there are still significant costs 
associated with differing regulatory regimes. These costs, outlined in Part III, 
range from duplicative costs to firms, to increased costs to the consumer, to 
lost opportunities that can only be alleviated through the harmonization of 
financial regulations. Additionally, as shown by the waning support for 
reforms in other global forums, it will be far easier for the U.S. and the EU to 
come to an agreeable arrangement in bilateral talks. This is why TTIP should 
and must include financial services into the final agreement. If financial 
services regulations are included, several major areas need to be addressed. As 
noted in Part IV, these include but are not limited to: a single accounting 
standard, closing loopholes in existing regulations, and minimizing 
unnecessary risk taking by financial institutions. Even if only these three areas 
are harmonized, TTIP will have gone further than any other cooperative effort 
in financial regulation. 
Part V presented a six point plan to achieve harmonization through TTIP. 
TTIP should strive to synchronize existing regulations, provide guidelines for 
initiating and developing new regulations, have a framework to implement new 
regulations, have effective cross-border supervision, and enforce the 
regulations fairly and effectively in both jurisdictions. Last, Part VI outlined 
the impacts of including financial services in TTIP. Doing so could provide a 
much needed $200 billion injection into the economies of America and 
Europe. Additionally, with nearly half of the world’s GDP following the same 
financial framework, the rest of the world will fall in line or risk being left 
behind. The U.S. and EU will be the de facto standard setters in the financial 
industry and will be able to steer in any direction they deem fit. 
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In the age of globalization, economies have become so intertwined that a 
few major bank failures triggered a worldwide recession,218 the likes of which 
had not been seen since World War II.219 While there are many ongoing efforts 
that are addressing global financial reform, they have not been effective in 
gaining a consensus.220 As such, TTIP provides a unique opportunity for two 
of the world’s superpowers to come together and bilaterally determine the 
future of the global financial landscape. Financial services be included in the 
TTIP negotiations to exclude them would be an error that could most likely not 
be remedied in the foreseeable future. This paper has outlined the who, why, 
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